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NOTES.J

MR. SPEAKER:
Face to face with the beginning of another biennial cycle we
see the legislature of Kentucky assembling at the capitol of the
State. It may be safely assumed that no State in the Union can
boast of a higher order of men in its lawmaking body than those

Mr. Speaker:
who will sit at Frankfort during the next two months. We are
asking ourselves the question: What will they accomplish for Kentucky ?
In the past we have had too much personal politics, too much
factionalism and too much narrow partisanship. We have had too
little thinking, too little work and too little constructive service.
In a nutshell, politics to the exclusion of busihess has -become the
bane of Kentucky. We do not mean politics in the sense in which
John Adams termed it a "divine science," but-rather that.brand
which prompted the late Jim Mulligan to pen the last line of his
famous poem. We have seen legislatures composed in the main of
capable and honorable citizens assemble under propitious stars,
only to degenerate into a carnival of legislative miscellany resembling a two-ring circus. Past history has forced a large majority of our thinking people who have no axes to' grind, and are
not lured by the aroma of the pie counter, to distrust their legislators, and to look with favor upon 'no legislative act except a motion to adjourn. This attitude on the part of business men generally caused a distinguished Kentuckian to say of a session of
our General Assembly that when final adjournment took place the
galleries arose and sang: "Praise God From Whom All-Blessings
Flow."
An insuperable obstacle to constructive work by our legislature
has been what Jefferson deprecated as the "mania for over-governing." Men arrive at Frankfort nursing the vagary that they are
destined to save the country, and, returning to their admiring constituents, garner fresh 'laurels in the arena of partisan politics. Pursuing that fantasy they proceed to cover the clerk's desk with "pet
measures" of their own. In statutes they seek a cure for every ill,
a pianacea for every evil.
George Sutherland, of Utah, late President of the American
Bar Association, recently said:
"Under our form of government the will of the people is supreme. We seem to have become intoxicated with the plenitude
of our power, or fearful that it will disappear if we do not constantly use it, and, inasmuch as our will can be exercised a uthori-
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tatively only through some form of law, whenever we become dissatished with anything, we enact a statute on the subject.
"'If, therefore, I were asked to name the characteristic which
more than any other distinguishes our present-day political institutions, I am not sure that I should not answer, 'The passion for making
laws.' There are 48, small or moderate-sized legislative bodies in
the United States engaged a good deal of the time and one very
large National legislature working overtime at this amiable occupation, their combined output being not far from 15,000 statutes each
year. The prevailing obsession seems to be that statutes, like the
crops, enrich the country in proportion to their volume. Unfortunately for this notion, however, the average legislator does not
always know .what he is sowing and the harvest which frequently
results is made up of strange and unexpected plants whose appearance is as astonishing to the legislator, as it is disconcerting to his
constituents."
Closely akin to-and rendering more dangerous-this legislative cure-all craze is the tyranny of an unrestrained majority
grown intolerant of a helpless minority. With a propensity for
crystallizing every popular whim into law and at the same time
intolerant of the opinions of other men the legislative majority,
become a capricious monster, is the worst menace to a free State.
De Toequeville said:
"if ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that
event may be attributed to the -unlimited authority of the majority."
In the Federalist, No. 51, Hamilton voiced the same fear. And
so did Mladison, the Father of the Constitution, as recorded in Annals of Congress, vol. 1, pages 454-5. The last word on this point
was expressed by Jefferson in a letter to Madison, as follows:
"The executive power in our government is not the only, perhaps not even the principal object of my solicitude. The tyranny
of the legislature is really the danger most to be feared, and will
continue to be so for many years to come."
Louis XIV said: "I am the State." Under our constitutional
system-the people are the State; and a legislative majority consti-

Mr. Speaker:
tutes a de facto sovereign for two years .at least. When this hydrahead of sovereignty arrogates to itself the power claimed by Louis
XIV; applies to itself the old maxim of English law, "The king
can do no wrong;" then, manifests its power in a profusion of
statutes, it is high time for the individual citizen to shake himself
and remember that "Eternal -vigilance is the price of liberty."
Not only does our legislative practice make our statute books
a crazy-quilt of nondescript laws, and. too often establish the absolutism of a majority, but many sorely needed laws are lost or destroyed in the legislative mill. With so many bills introduced, the
orders of the day soon become hopelessly congested. This is followed by logrolling, jockeying for position, and every scheme of
parliamentary chicanery and political leger-de-main that men or
devils can contrive. The result. is that little progress can be made
until the last few days of the session, and then meritorious measures are slaughtered in the hurly-burly of the closing hours. For
example, in 1916 that was the sad fate of the bill to raise the standard for admission tn the bar, although it had passed the Senate
with only four votes 3corded against it, and would have had no
serious opposition in the House. We could cite countless similar
examples.
We are not cynical like Thomas Carlyle, who, it is claimed, said
that the only acts of Parliament entitled to commendation 'were those
by which previous acts were repealed. We are not a blind disciple"
of Humboldt, Mill or Herbert Spencer, or an adherent to the extreme doctrines of laissez-faire, but we have long believed that
there is a lot of common sense in the homely philosophy -of the
darkey who said to his white neighbor, a candidate for the legislature, "We've got enough laws now, if you'll jes' put 'em in circulation." Indeed, we may not inappropriately paraphrase a hoary
maxim of law, and say: Sound public policy-abhors an inoidinate
multiplicity of statutes.
The Kentucky Law Journal, as a publication, has no politics,
and is not concerned with the rise or fall of the political fortunes
of any man or set of men. Its editor has no irons in the political
fire, and bends to the yoke of no faction. These columns have been
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dedicated to the bench and bar of this Commonwealth. In her century and a quarter of statehood, Kentucky has had no class of citizens more devoted to the public service and more consecrated to the
preservation'of liberty and democracy unsullied and unimpaired
than the men who have dignified her judiciary and adorned her
forum. The muse of Kentucky history will ever guard the names
of such lawyers as John Breckinridge, Ben Hardin, John Rowan,
Charles I¥ickliffe, Henry Clay, Thomas F. Marshall, Richard Menifee, Madison C. Johnson, John Boyle, James Harlan, John J. Crittenden, John B. Huston, Joseph Underwood, Elijah Hise, George Robertson, John A1. Harlan and a legion of others. In names like these
old Kentucky's grandeur lies. And it is in behalf of the successors
of these men-the lawyers of today who have at heart the general
welfare and would elevate the ideals of public service-that we appeal for the present legislature to lay aside petty personal politics
and to devote their session to constructive service for our State.
A session of the Kentucky legislature-judging by the pastmay be aptly likened to a voyage on a tempestuous sea. Those
legislative mariners who would keep the Ship of State in safe
waters can find no better chart than the political philosophy of
Thomas Jefferson. De Tocqueville pronounced him "the most
powerful advocate democracy has ever sent forth." Jefferson said:
"I am not a friend to a very energetic government. It is always
His sage philosophy found terse, cogent expression
oppressive."
in the familiar aphorism, "That government is best which governs
least.'"-V. C.
0

RAILROAD PRESIDENT MUST ANSWER QUESTIONS OF
I. C. C.
The power to regulate interstate commerce was granted to Congress by Article 1, Section 8, sub-section 3, of the Federal Constitution, but was virtually a dead letter until the Act of Congress to
Regulate Commerce was approved February 4, 1887. This act and
its subsequent amendments have given to the Interstate Commerce

Mr. Speaker:

Commission almost unlimited authority in the regulation of common
carriers doing an interstate business. By legislative enactment and
judicial decisions the power of the Commission has been established
to supervise and investigate all the activities of carriers, even their
accounts, vouchers and expenditures being subject to the minutest
scrutiny and their occult activities the legitimate object of governmental inquisition.
The railroads, incorporated under State laws, are quasi-public
corporations. Their calling is said to be.affected with a public
interest. They are public servants and all the people have a more
or less direct interest in the conduct of their affairs. The Supreme
Court .recently approved the following statement of the Interstate
Commerce Commission: "There can be nothing private or confidential in the activities and expenditures of a carrier engaged in
interstate commerce." Therefore, public policy demanded the extension which has been made of the power of the Commission to
regulate and investigate the affairs of carriers as public agents.
In response to a subpoena the president of the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad Company testified at a hearing of the Interstate Commerce Commission May 4, 1916. Various questions were
addressed to him concerning the matter'of campaign contributions
and political activities on the part of his road. He was asked if the
L. & N. Railroad Co. had given money for campaign purposes and
for the suppression of competition and charged the amounts on the
company's books to operating, construction or legal expenses. These
questions the president, on advice of counsel, refused to answer. In
the case of M. H. Smith v. Interstate Commerce Commission, U. S.
Adv. Ops. 1917, page 47, Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the
opinion of the court, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia requiring Mr. Smith to answer the questions at issue. The public interest demanding consideration at all
times, "the Commission must have power to prevent evasion of its
orders, and detect in any formal compliance or in the assignment
of expenses a 'possible concealment of forbidden practices.' "
The decision above mentioned does not purport to forbid a railroad company's attempting by legitimate advertising "to mold or
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enlighten public opinion." But in order to guard against possible
abuses it seems to be incontrovertibly sound public policy that
the railroads' "conduct and the expenditures of their funds are
open to inquiry." The learned justice ably said: "If it may not
rest inactive and suffer injustice, it may not, on the other hand,
use its funds and its power in opposition to the policies of government . . . . The purpose of an investigation is the penetrati on
of disguises or to form a definite estimate of any conduct of the
carriers that may in any way affect their-relation to the public."-V.C.
-0

THE LAW OF TREASON.*
Prosecutions for treason have been few for many years and the
very name has lain dormant for half a century or more until resurrected by recent events. As the crime is the highest known to the
law and always tends powerfully to excite and agitate the popular
mind, the framers of thp Constitution deemed it safest to define and
limit the offense in the fundamental document itself (Art. III, See. 3):
"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying
war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in
open court."
The terms here used were borrowed mainly from the famous
statute passed in the reign of Edward III (1352) on account of the
multitude of treasons that had arisen by arbitrary judicial construction
at the instigation of the crown under the ancient common law. The
language of the statute was weighed, interpreted and glossed by successive generations of English judges and commentators and the meaning well settled at the time the Constitution was adopted.
The question of what constitutes "levying war" against the
United States came up in the Supreme Court for the first time on a mo*Herbert A. Howell in Law Notes.

The Law of Treason
tion for writs of certiorari to review the proceedings of the Circuit
Court in Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout (1807, 2 Curtis [U. S.] 23),
emissaries of Aaron Burr in his alleged treasonable plans. Speaking through Chief Justice Marshall the court held that to complete
the crime of levying war there must be an actual assemblage of. men
for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable design, but that all
those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from
the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors. In the case before the court,
a design to overturn the federal government in New Orleans by force
would unquestionably have been a design which, if carried into execution, would have amounted to treason, but no mere consultation or
conspiracy for this object, no enlisting of men uncombined with an
attempt to effect it, would be an act of levying war. Some actual force
or violence must be used in pursuance. of the design, though the
quantum of force is immaterial. There need not be military array or
weapons; numbers alone may supply the requisite force.. These principles were shortly afterwards discussed at large and reaffirmed by the
Chief Justice sitting on circuit in the trial of Aaron Burr (25 Fed. Cas.
No. 14,693), and his language has become crystallized in the general
law on this branch of the subject.
But levying war is not only war for the purpose. of entirely overthrowing the government. It includes as well an assembling of men acting in forcible opposition to any law of the United States pursuant to
a common design to prevent the execution of that law in all cases or any
case within their reach, under any pretense of its being unequal,
burdensome, oppressive, or unconstitutional (Case of Pries, 9 Fed.
Cas. No. 5,127). It is not enough if the intention be merely to defeat
the operation of the law in a particular instance, or through the agency
of a particular officer, for some private or personal motive; the
object of the resistance must be of a public and general character (U.
S. v. Hoxie, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,407). On the other hand, if the object
be to prevent the execution of one or more of the laws of a particular
state, but without any intention to intermeddle with the relations of
that state with national government or to displace the national laws or
sovereignty therein, that is treason against the state only (Story, J.,
Charge, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,275; People v. Lynch, 11 John. N. Y. 549).
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What constitutes an "over act" under the second branch of the
definition, namely, giving aid and comfort (adhering) to the enemy, is
more difficult. The question will necessarily depend very much upon
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, but obviously the
act must always be of a character susceptible of clear .proof and not
resting in mere inference, conjecture or suspicion. In general, it has
been held that when war exists any act clearly indicating a want of loyalty to the government, and sympathy with its enemies, and which by
fair construction is directly in furtherance.of their hostile designs,,renders them aid and comfort; or if this be the natural consequence of the
act, if successful, it is treasonable in its character (Leavitt, J., Charge,30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,272). Every act which in regard to. a domestic
rebellion would make the party guilty of levying war would in regard to a foreign power with which the United States .is
at war constitute "adhering to their enemies" (U. S. v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. Cas.
No. 15,254.)
Some acts leave little or no room for doubt, such as the communication of intelligence to the enemy by letter, telegraph or otherwise, relating to the strength, movements or position of the army;
furnishing arms, troops, munitions, etc., and sending money and provisions, or obtaining credits, all with intent to aid the enemy in his
acts of hositility (Nelson, J., Charge, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,271). The
destruction of munitions and supplies designed for the army in the
field would seem unquestionably to belong to the same category, for
the aid is none the less effectual that it is indirect. War is necessarily
a trial of strength between the belligerents, and whatever weakens one
gives corresponding advantage, to the other. It makes no difference
whether or not the enterprise .commenced shall -be successful and
actually render assistance. The bare sending of intelligence, for example, which is.usually the most valuable aid that can be given, will
make a man a traitor even though the intelligence should happen to
be intercepted; for the party in sending it did all he could; the treason
was complete on his part though it had not the effect he intended
(U. S. v. Greathouse, supra).
'Mere expressions of opinion, however, indicative of sympathy with
the public. enemy will not in themselves constitute an overt act,
.although when uttered in relation to an act which, if committed with
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a treasonable design, might amount to such overt act, they are admissible as evidence tending to characterize it and to show the intent
with which the act was committed; and they may also furnish some
evidence of the act itself against the accused. But this is the extent to
which such publications or utterances may be used either in finding
a bill of indictment or on the trial of it (Nelson, J., supra). So als6
felonious attempts being essential, it is competent to show that some
time before the event facts had occurred and rumors were prevalent
in the neighborhood which would explain certain particulars relied
on to show a treasonable intent and make the accused show a different
one (U. S. v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,299).
In treason there are no accessories. All persons who counsel and
incite others to subvert the government or resist the law by force, or
to give aid and comfort to the enemy, are in contemplation of law
principals, although they may not themselves directly participate or
be actually present at the immediate scene of violence; for successfully to instigate treason is to commit it (Ex parte Bollman and Case
of Fries, supra). No plea of compulsion will excuse a treasonable act
unless it were done under an immediate and well-founded fear of
death or grievous bodily harm. Mere apprehension of any loss of
property, or of slight or remote injury to the person, is not enough
(U. S. v. Vigol, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,621).
In legislating on the subject Congress has provided that "Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them,
or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the
"United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason," punishable by death
or, at the discretion of the court, by imprisonment for not less than
five years coupled with a fine of not less than ten thousand dollars
and incapacity to hold any office under the United States (Fed. Crim.
Code, sees. 1 and 2). The words "owing allegiance to the United
States" are here entirely. surplusage and do not in the slightest degree
affect the sense of the section (U. S. v, Wiltberger, 4 Curtis [U. S]
574). for treason is a breach of allegiance and it is well settled that
every resident or sojourner within the United States. as well as every
citizen, owes to the government a local allegiance, permanent or
temporary, sufficient to subject him to the penalties of treason
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(Carlisle v. U. S., 83 U. S. 154). Protectio trabit subjectionem et
subjectio protectionem.
In conclusion, it should'be noted that Congress has also defined
and penalized misprision of treason, or the bare knowledge and concealment of treason in others, without any degree of assent thereto
(Code, sec. 3), thus accentuating the plain duty of everyone to expose
treason and bring traitors to justice.

DUTY OF THE BAR
Every member of the Bar who would uphold the standard of
justice, advance the science of jurisprudence and temper the juridical sword in Kentucky, is urged to lay his personil affairs aside
for a little while and communicate with his Representative and
Senator; asking their support of the bill that will be advocated before the legislature by the Bar &ssociation's Committee on Legal
Education and Admission to the Bar. (It is Senate Bill No. 43, introduced by Senator Mv.C. Swinford, of Cynthiana). The lawyers of
Kentucky should awake from their lethargy in this matter and emulate the laudable and victorious efforts of the medical profession in
recent years. We should not permit private business or personal politics to interfere with the performance of this, our imperative duty. If
this needed legislation is not agitated and supported by the reputable
members of the Bar we certainly can not hope for its successful championship by members- of other professions. The call, therefore, is
to the member, of the Bar, that we gird our armor on, and (paraphrasing Grant's famous statement) win this fight if it takes all
winter.-V. C.

